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CASES NOTED
have upon the trial system? There are distinct advantages to having a
six-member jury; less time is needed to impanel juries, court costs are
reduced, and possibly less time will be needed in deciding cases. 1 The
time spent during the trial itself is shortened since, presumably, six per-
sons can look at exhibits and make their exits and entries quicker than
twelve persons. In addition, time spent in polling the jury will be les-
sened. Even though the time saved with each case will be negligible,
when all cases are considered together, the time saved will be significant.4
The way appears clear for additional improvements, which may
enable speedier and less expensive trials without affecting the "fairness"
of a trial by jury. Since a majority of federal district courts have already
passed local rules reducing the size of their juries, this decision serves to
lend support to what has already been done.
DEBRA J. Kossow
SECURITY INTERESTS: SELF-HELP STILL AN AVAILABLE
METHOD OF REPOSSESSION
Plaintiff bought an automobile from defendant under a conditional
sales agreement. The contract provided that in the event of default, de-
fendant would have all the rights and remedies of a secured party under
the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in Florida. Upon default by
plaintiff, defendant, without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, took pos-
session of the car pursuant to section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.' Plaintiff brought suit for unlawful conversion and damages. The
trial court, relying upon Fuentes v. Shevin, granted plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment, holding that section 9-503, as applied to the
facts and circumstances of the instant case, violated plaintiff's proced-
ural due process rights under the fourteenth amendment. On direct ap-
41. Croake, Memorandum on the Advisability and Constitutionality of Six Man Juries
and 5/6 Verdicts in Civil Cases, 44 N.Y. STATE B.J. 385 1972). For an estimate as to how
much money will be saved, see Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution
of the Federal Jury, 38 U. Cm L. REv. 710, 711 (1971). As for less time to impanel juries,
it has been argued that attorneys may be more selective in their voir dire examinations when
facing the prospect of a six-member jury. However, ethical considerations require attorneys
to take great care in the selection of each juror, regardless of the prospective jury size. Powell,
supra note 24, at 87.
42. Powell, supra note 24, at 87.
1. FLA. STAT. § 679.503 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as section 9-503].
2. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Fuentes]. In Fuentes, the Supreme
Court found Florida's prejudgment repelvin statute and a similar Pennsylvania statute invalid
under the fourteenth amendment. The Florida statute provided that upon posting a bond of
double the value of the chattel sought to be seized, a creditor could interpose the sheriff be-
tween himself and the debtor in a repossession. FLA. STAT. §§ 78.01, .07, .08, .10, .13 (1971).
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peal to the Supreme Court of Florida, held, reversed and remanded:
There is not a sufficient element of state action in self-help repossession
under section 9-503 to invoke the applicability of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973).
Northside Motors is the most recent in a series of cases throughout
the country questioning the constitutional validity of the self-help pro-
visions of section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code.8 The issue
in those cases, just as that considered by the Supreme Court of Florida,
was "whether there is a sufficient element of state action [in self-help
repossession] to invoke the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States .... ." If so, the doctrine enun-
ciated in Fuentes5 would apply and section 9-5031 would, in its present
form and practice, be unconstitutional.
It is well established that the restrictions on actions imposed by the
fourteenth amendment apply only to such action as could properly be
called "state action." "Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the [fourteenth] amendment."7
In Shelly v. Kraemer8 and Barrows v. Jackson,' the United States
Supreme Court held that although private agreements consisting of
racial restrictions on the use and disposition of real property are private
actions not under the purview of the fourteenth amendment, judicial
enforcement of such agreements, at law or in equity, constitutes state
action under the fourteenth amendment, and is therefore forbidden.
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, ° the Supreme Court
held that the exclusion of a black patron, solely on account of race, from
a restaurant operated by a private corporation under a lease in a build-
ing financed and owned by an administrative agency of the state, was a
discriminatory state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
3. The following is a list of all reported cases directly ruling on the constitutionality of
Uniform Commercial Code section 9-503. Colvin v. Avco Fin. Serv., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 25
(D. Utah 1973) (constitutional); Michel v. Rex-Norelco, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 543 (D.
Vt. 1972) (unconstitutional); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972) (con-
stitutional); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972) (constitu-
tional); Greene v. First Nat'l Exchange Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972) (constitu-
tional); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (constitutional); Adams
v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (unconstitutional); McCormick v. First Nat'l
Bank, 322 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (constitutional); Kipp v. Coyens, 11 UCC REP.
SERV. 1067 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972) (constitutional); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121
N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972) (constitutional); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz, 11
UCC REP. SERV. 627 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Kings Cty. 1972) (constitutional); Brown v. United
States Nat'l Bank, - Ore. -, 509 P.2d 442 (1973) (constitutional); Plante v. Industrial
Nat'l Bank, 12 UCC EP. SERv. 739 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1973) (constitutional).
4. 282 So. 2d at 620.
5. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
6. FLA. STAT. § 679.503 (1971).
7. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
8. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
9. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
10. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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The Supreme Court of Delaware" had held that the restaurant had been
acting "in a purely private capacity"12 under its lease and that its action
was not that of the state within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In reversing, the United States Supreme Court held that "[o]nly
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involve-
ment of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."' 8
The Court went on to hold: "By its inaction.., the State has not only
made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its
power, property, and prestige behind the admitted discrimination."'4
In Reitman v. Mulkey,5 the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the Supreme Court of California holding unconstitu-
tional a recently added section of the California Constitution which pro-
hibited the state from denying any person the right to sell, lease or
rent his real property to any such person as he in his absolute discretion
desires.' The Court stated that in determining the constitutionality of
such provisions, courts must look to the "immediate objectives" and
"ultimate effect' '1 7 of the statutes. The Court concluded that "[t]he
right to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the State....
[T]he section will significantly encourage and involve the State in pri-
vate discriminations"' and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
In the recent case of Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 9 the Supreme
Court apparently indicated an outer limit to the definition of state action.
Plaintiff, Irvis, was the black guest of a white member of a private club.
The club had discriminatory membership policies, and the club's bylaws
prohibited the serving of blacks. After being refused service of food and
alcoholic beverage because of his race, Irvis filed suit seeking injunctive
relief requiring the state liquor control board to revoke the club's liquor
license until it discontinued its discriminatory practices. The Court re-
fused, holding that the mere issuance of a liquor license to a club which
practiced racial discrimination was not sufficient state involvement in
the discriminatory acts to be violative of the fourteenth amendment.
[I]t cannot be said [that granting the license] in any way
foster[s] or encourage[s] racial discrimination. Nor can it be
said to make the State in any realistic sense a partner or even ajoint venturer in the club's enterprise."
However, the Court did find that the provision in the State Liquor Con-
11. Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Burton, 39 Del. Chanc. Rep. 10, 157 A.2d 894 (1960).
12. Id. at 22, 157 A.2d at 902.
13. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 716, 722 (1961) (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
15. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
16. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26. The new section, in effect, negated all of California's fair
housing laws by making them unconstitutional.
17. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967).
18. Id. at 381.
19. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
20. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972).
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trol Board regulations which required each private club licensee to "ad-
here to all the provisions of its constitution and bylaws,"'" as applied
to the facts of the instant case, was unconstitutional state action com-
pelling discrimination.
Against this background, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that self-help repossession by a creditor does not constitute
state action. Florida Statutes, section 679.503 [UCC section
9-503] is no more than a codification ... of a common law
right and a contract right recognized long before the promul-
gation thereof and creates no new rights. 2
The court quoted with approval the following statement by Pro-
fessor Soia Mentschikoff on behalf of the Permanent Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code:
Section 9-503 simply recognizes this common knowledge of
buyers on time that repossession follows default and makes
unnecessary its statement in the contract. It cannot be that
codifying a generally understood practice of ancient and honor-
able lineage and surrounding it with safeguards renders the
practice unconstitutional.23
The court went on to state that the trial court erred in extending
Fuentes24 to these facts, relying on the statement in Fuentes that its
holding "is a narrow one. ' 25 Several other recent cases dealing with the
constitutional validity of section 9-503 have distinguished Fuentes in
the same manner.26 While not asserting that the Supreme Court in
Fuentes intended to declare self-help repossession unconstitiutional, it is
important to note that while that case does contain the phrase, "[o]ur
holding is a narrow one," the phrase appears in the middle of a para-
graph concerning the adequacy of hearing proceedings.2 From a reading
of Fuentes, it appears that what the Court meant was that something
less than a full-scale trial might suffice to satisfy the due process require-
ment. As there was no in-depth discussion of the definition of state action
in the opinion, it would seem unlikely that the "narrow holding" phrase
referred to anything but the adequacy of hearing procedures.
Although reversed on appeal in a decision similar to Northside, the
21. REGULATIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD § 113.09 (June 1970).
22. 282 So. 2d at 622, and cases cited therein.
23. 282 So. 2d at 623.
24. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
25. Id. at 96.
26. Brown v. United States Nat'l Bank, - Ore. -, 509 P.2d 442 (1973); Greene v.
First Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Plante v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 12
UCC REP. SERV. 739 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1973).
27. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972). Justice White, in his dissent, feared the
downfall of section 9-503 because of the majority's decision, yet the majority chose not to
address itself to this problem. The "narrow holding" interpretation given Fuentes by many
courts seems anomalous in light of the dissent's interpretation. See Note, 26 U. MIAmI L.
REv. 823 (1972).
CASES NOTED
Southern District Court of California, in Adams v. Egley, has, to date,
presented the most cogent argument against the constitutionality of sec-
tion 9-503.28 The Adams court, relying on the holding in Reitman v.
Mulkey,29 declared self-help repossession under section 9-5038o to be
unconstitutional state action.
[I]t cannot be seriously questioned that the presence of Sec-
tions [9-503 and 9-504] had a significant impact on the con-
tents of [the] contract's provisions. The specific reference to
the Uniform Commercial Code in the ... contract and to "im-
mediate possession.., according to law" ... are ample indi-
cation that in drawing up the agreements ... creditors were
"persuaded or induced to include" repossession by the fact
that such repossession was permitted by statute. These Com-
mercial Code sections set forth a state policy, and the secur-
ity agreements upon which the instant actions rest.., are
merely an embodiment of that policy. It is therefore apparent
that the acts of repossession were made "under color of state
law .... 71
The opinions reported thus far have more or less followed either
the reasoning of Northside Motors8 2 or the alternative represented by
Adams, 3 with the exception of an unreasoned state trial opinion 4 which
simply assumed that Fuentes had declared section 9-503 unconstitutional.
The split on the "state action" issue will apparently be resolved only
when the United States Supreme Court decides the issue.
If it is determined that repossession under section 9-503 is action
under color of state law, then the courts will have to face another issue
not dealt with by the Supreme Court of Florida in the instant case:
Whether the debtor, by signing the conditional sales agreement, has
28. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 13
UCC REP. SERV. 161 (9th Cir. 1973) [the district court decision will be hereinafter referred
to as Adams]. The Court of Appeals had granted leave for Soia Mentschikoff to file an
amicus curiae brief representing the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Her brief, styled as an article, may be found at 14 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 767 (1973).
29. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
30. CAL. Comm. CODE ANN. § 9-503 (Deering 1963).
31. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 617-18 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (citation omitted), rev'd.,
Adams v. Southern Cal. Nat'l Bank, 13 UCC REP. SERV. 161 (9th Cir. 1973).
32. 282 So. 2d 617. Accord, Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank,
13 UCC REP. SEav. 738 (8th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Southern Cal. Nat'l Bank, 13 UCC REP.
SER. 161 (9th Cir. 1973). Colvin v. Avco Fin. Serv., 12 UCC REP. SERV. 25 (D. Utah 1973);
Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F.
Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972);
Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank,
322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295
A.2d 402 (1972); Brown v. United States Nat'l Bank, - Ore. -, 509 P.2d 442 (1973);
Plante v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 12 UCC REP. SERV. 739 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1973).
33. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). Accord, Michel v. Rex-Norelco, Inc., 12 UCC
REP. SERv. 543 (D. Vt. 1972).
34. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz, 11 UCC REP. SEav. 627 (N.Y. Civil Ct., Kings Cty.
1972).
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waived his constitutional right to due process. The United States Su-
preme Court has recently dealt with the waiver problem in two cases
which were argued and decided on the same day, Swarb v. Lennox"
and D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.8 Both cases involved the constitu-
tional validity of cognovit notes as authorized by the states from which
the cases arose.
In D. H. Overmyer v. Frick Co.,8 7 plaintiff, a large corporation, chal-
lenged the constitutional validity of a judgment entered upon a cognovit
note, asserting that " 'it is unconstitutional to waive in advance the right
to present a defense in an action on the note.' "Is The Court upheld the
validity of the cognovit note and judgment entered thereon.
Even if, for present purposes, we assume that the standard
for waiver [of fourteenth amendment rights] in a corporate
property right case of this kind is the same standard applicable
to waiver in a criminal proceeding, that is, that it must be
voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made, or "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,"
and even if, as the Court has said in the civil area, "we do
not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights,"
that standard was full satisfied here.
Overmyer is a corporation.... This is not a case of unequal
bargaining power or overreaching. The Overmyer-Frick agree-
ment, from the start, was not a contract of adhesion. There
was no refusal on Frick's part to deal with Overmyer unless
Overmyer agreed to a cognovit8 9
The Court, however, inserted a caveat to the holding, in what it
termed its concluding comments:
Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other
facts of other cases. For example, where the contract is one
of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power,
and where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit pro-
vision, other legal consequences may ensue.4°
The Court had occasion to make reference to that caveat in Swarb
v. Lennox. 41 In that case, plaintiffs instituted a class action alleging that
the Pennsylvania confession of judgment system was on its face uncon-
stitutional. The three-judge district court held that for the class of
signers of cognovit notes with annual incomes of less than $10,000, there
35. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
36. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 184. The quote is from the transcript of the oral arguments.
39. Id. at 185-86 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs had signed the note after defaulting on
a large contract, replaced the contract obligation with a note, and subsequently defaulted on
the note. In return for the cognovit provision, plaintiff received both more time to pay and
a lower interest rate.
40. Id. at 188.
41. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
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was no intelligent waiver of the constitutional right to a hearing.42 The
plaintiffs appealed, contending that the district court's holding should
be extended to all signers, regardless of annual income. The Supreme
Court refused to extend the holding. Although the Court had no jurisdic-
tion with respect to the validity of the decision as to signers with in-
comes of less than $10,0008 it intimated that this might be a proper
situation for application of the aforementioned caveat to D. H. Overmyer
Co. v. Frick Co.44
The Court had opportunity to face the waiver issue more squarely
in Fuentes,45 where defendant claimed that plaintiff, Margarita Fuentes,
waived her right to due process by signing a standard form conditional
sales agreement. The Supreme Court again made reference to its caveat
in D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.46 and commented that, on the sur-
face, this would appear to be a situation which the caveat would hold.
However, the Court based its rejection of defendant's contention on the
grounds that the alleged waiver merely stated that the seller had the
right to repossess upon default.
[A] waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the
very least, be clear....
The conditional sales contracts here simply provided that
upon a default the seller "may take back," "may retake," or
"may repossess" merchandise. The contracts included nothing
about the waiver of a prior hearing. 7
Thus far, no court which has found state action in self-held repos-
session, thus subjecting the act of repossession to the due process require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment, has found an effective waiver of
due process rights. 8 It would appear that, at this time, for an effective
waiver to exist, the agreement must not be contained in a contract of
adhesion, and the agreement must inform the buyer of his rights at the
same time he signs them away. Thus, if state action were found in self-
help repossession, as authorized in the Uniform Commercial Code, it
would appear unlikely that the Court would find an effective waiver of
due process rights in the mere signing of standard conditional sales
agreements.
DAVID SMITH
42. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
43. No party challenged the propriety of the lower court's ruling as to persons with
annual incomes of less than $10,000. Therefore the Court was without jurisdiction as to that
part of the opinion.
44. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 201 (1972), citing D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,
405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972).
45. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
46. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972), citing D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,
405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972).
47. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95-96 (1972) (emphasis in original).
48. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Michel v. Rex-Norelco, Inc.,
12 UCC REP. SERv. 542 (D. Vt. 1972).
